This post is of excerpts I found interesting from a collection of texts related to Aristotle’s biology, with which I engaged for Professor Christof Rapp and Katharina Epstein’s course on the biological works at the Munich School of Ancient Philosophy (University of Munich) and for myself outside of the course. Interspersed are some of my immediate thoughts. This post, all my posts, is intended just for me [and does not purport to be a comprehensive account of Aristotle’s biology], but if it is interesting or helpful for anyone else, that would of course make me happy. 🙂

Aristotle's Biology

Aristotle’s biological writings account for about 1/3 of Aristotle’s extant writings. This page is organized in this order of texts, though I am reading excerpts from these works very much not in this order:

  • On the Parts of Animals (PA), Partibus Animalium
  • History of Animals (HA), Historia Animalium
  • On the Progression of Animals (IA)
  • On the Movement of Animals (MA)
  • Parva Naturalia (PN, writings on psychophysical subjects)
  • On the Generation of Animals (GA), Generatione Animalium
  • On Plants (lost)
  • Anatomical Atlas (lost)
    On the Parts of Animals: Partibus Animalium
    Book I 1

    πονθε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ τὰ ὄστρεια. τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον ὁμοιότητι… ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει μικρότητι… ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. [644b10-16]

    Birds, Fishes, Cephalopods, Testacea. Within each of these groups, the parts do not differ so far that they correspond only by analogy… that is, they differ not structurally, but only in respect of bodily qualities, e.g. by being larger or smaller… to put it generally, they differ “by the more and less”.

    Book I 5
    Book II 1
    History of Animals: Historia Animalium
    Book VIII (IX) 1

    Τὰ δ’ ἤθη τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶ τῶν μὲν ἀμαυροτέρων καὶ βραχυβιωτέρων ἧττον ἡμῖν ἔνδηλα κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῶν δὲ μακροβιωτέρων ἐνδηλότερα. φαίνονται γὰρ ἔχοντά τινα δύναμιν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθημάτων φυσικήν, περί τε φρόνησιν καὶ εὐήθειαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δειλίαν, περί τε πραότητα καὶ χαλεπότητα καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας ἕξεις. ἔνια δὲ κοινωνεῖ τινὸς ἅμα καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας, τὰ μὲν παρ’ ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων… [608a11-19]

    The characters of the animals are less obvious to us by perception in the case of the less developed and shorter-lived ones, but more obvious in the longer-lived. For they are seen to have a certain natural capability in relation to each of the soul’s affections-to intelligence and stupidity, courage and cowardice, to mildness and ferocity, and the other dispositions of this sort. Certain animals at the same time are receptive of some learning and instruction, some from each other, some from humans…

    So if Aristotle is using φρόνησις in the way that he uses it in other texts, then we could have a bit of difficulty understanding how exactly he thinks human beings are so special and apparently the only animal with the differentiae of being rational. If we take the division of the soul from EN for example, i.e. nutritive, appetitive, rationally calculating and scientific parts (I know I’m being uncareful here), then the only part of the soul that seems to be unique to humans is the scientific part. But both the rationally calculating and scientific parts are considered to be the rational part of the soul, so. Animals sharing in the affections of courage and cowardice, mildness or ferocity seem to have no conceptual difficulty after accepting that they can have some share in the phronetic part, for that part is the part that would command the non-rational parts of the soul necessary to be these things. Anyway.

    ἐν πᾶσι δ’ ὅσοις ἐστὶ γένεσι τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν, σχεδὸν ἡ φύσις ὁμοίως διέστησε τὸ ἦθος τῶν θηλειῶν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρρένων. [608a22-23]

    μαλακώτερον γὰρ τὸ ἦθός ἐστι τῶν θηλειῶν, καὶ τιθασσεύεται θᾶττον, καὶ προσίεται τὰς χεῖρας μᾶλλον, καὶ μαθηματικότερον, οἷον καὶ αἱ Λάκαιναι κύνες αἱ θήλειαι εὐφυέστεραι τῶν ἀρρένων.

    In all kinds in which there are the female and the male, nature has established much the same difference in the character of the females as compared with that of the males….

    For the character of the females is softer, and quicker to be tamed, and more receptive of handling, and readier to learn, for example the female Laconian hounds are in fact cleverer than the males.

    [Note to Self:] μαθηματικός of course has the usual meaning you know, but also has a sense of being an adjectival ‘fond of learning’ sort of thing, also as μαθητικός.

    It’s really interesting that Aristotle has the prerequisite of being a man for someone to be a good person when he observes that in almost all other animals the female is in a way more virtuous in virtue of being less prone to being driven by παθή and also more receptive to learning… this feature of his ethical philosophy is made further strange by the following passage:

    ἀθυμότερα δὲ τὰ θήλεα πάντα τῶν ἀρρένων πλὴν ἄρκτος καὶ πάρδαλις ‧ τούτων δ’ ἡ θήλεια δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀνδρειοτέρα. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις γένεσι τὰ θήλεα μαλακώτερα καὶ κακουργότερα καὶ ἧττον ἁπλᾶ καὶ προπετέστερα καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν τέκνων τροφὴν φροντιστικώτερα, τὰ δ’ ἄρρενα ἐναντίως θημωδέστερα καὶ ἀγριώτερα καὶ ἁπλούστερα καὶ ἧττον ἐπίβουλα. [608a33-b4]

    All females are less spirited than the males, except the bear and leopard: in these the female is held to be braver. But in the other kinds the females are softer, more vicious, less simple, more impetuous, more attentive to the feeding of the young, while the males on the contrary are more spirited, wilder, simpler, less cunning.

    And apparently these characteristics are amplified most in human beings…. Anyway, he also says these horrible things (below) about female animals so his assessment of human women is very much in line with his biology…. lol

    ἔστι δὲ καὶ δύσθυμον μᾶλλον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος καὶ δύσελπι, καὶ ἀναιδέστερον καὶ ωευδέστερον, εὐαπατητότερον δὲ καὶ μνημονικώτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἀγρυπνότερον καὶ ὀκνηρότερον καὶ ὅλως ἀκινητότερον τὸ θῆλυ τοῦ ἄρρενος, καὶ τροφῆς ἐλάττονός ἐστιν. [608b11-16]

    The female is also more dispirited and despondent than the male, more shameless and lying, is readier to deceive and has a longer memory; furthermore she is more wakeful, more afraid of action, and in general is less inclined to move than the male, and takes less nourishment.

    Interesting also because you should have to have more memory in order to cultivate any kind of scientific knowledge or gnosis more generally.

    But apparently males are braver haha, or so he says in the next part of the passage I won’t bother quoting.

    Now there’s a portion that immediately strikes a reader as resembling the Darwinian idea of natural selection:

    πόλεμος μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστὶν ὅσα τοὺς αὐτούς τε κατέχει τόπους καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ποιεῖται τὴν ζωήν. [608b19-21]

    Now there is a war against each other among all animals that occupy the same places and get there living from the same things.

    And the reasoning he provides would make one think Darwin copied it, i.e. there is scarcity of resources (habitats, food) and thus the animals who occupy the same habitats or feed off the same animals/resources.

    Most interestingly, he conjectures that wild and also violent animals are only violent when there is scarcity of resources:

    δῆλον δὲ ποιεῖ τοῦτο ἡ περὶ Αἴγυπτον ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ζῴων ‧ διὰ γὰρ τὸ τροφὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ἀπορεῖν μετ’ ἀλλήλων ζῶσι καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀγριώτατα ‧ διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας γὰρ ἡμεροῦται, οἷον ἐνιαχοῦ τὸ τῶν κροκοδείλων γένος πρὸς τὸν ἱερέα διὰ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς τροφῆς. [608b27-609a3]

    This is made clear by the way animals are looked after in Egypt; for because food is available and they are not in want, even the wildest animals live with each other; for they become tame because of the benefits given to them, for example in some places the crocodile kind has become tame towards the priest because their food is looked after.

    [Fun Fact Note:] “…swans are also the most apt of all birds to eat each other.” εἰσὶ δ’ οἱ κύκνοι καὶ ἀλληλοφάγοι μάλιστα τῶν ὀρνέων. [610a2-3]

    ἔστι δὲ τῶν θηρίων τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ πολέμια ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δ’ ὥσπερ ἄνθρωποι ὅταν τύχωσιν. [610a3-4]

    Some wild animals are always at war with each other, but others only on occasion, like humans.

    It seems to be the case that Aristotle is implying that the animals that share in rationality to a greater degree have the ability to stop fighting to a greater degree. I wonder how true that is. And, does he think that sharing in rationality to a greater degree entails being able to control the affections to a greater degree? Probably not, think: the breakdown of rationality into different kinds. So sharing in rationality is not well-defined here.

    διαφέρουσι δὲ καὶ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἀλλήλων οἱ ἐλέφαντες θαυμαστὸν ὅσον.

    The elephants in fact differ to a remarkable degree in courage.

    Aristotle’s understanding of animals not as a monolith and as extremely complex and variegated creatures is honestly better than what human beings are doing with each other right now. Perhaps I should go to sleep instead of reading articles on US politics.

    Book VIII (IX) 2

    Aristotle talks about schools of fish being friends, but otherwise fish are also at war. He has a huge list of fish that form shoals… I wonder how he even got to study all these types of fish? How?!

    Book VIII (IX) 3

    τὰ δ’ ἤθη τῶν ζῴων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, διαφέρει κατά τε δειλίαν καὶ πραότητα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ ἡμερότητα καὶ νοῦν τε καὶ ἄγνοιαν.

    The animals’ characters, as we have said earlier, differ both in respect of cowardice, mildness, courage, tameness, and also in mind and ignorance.

    OKAY, shoot, Aristotle is using νοῦς for animals here? and ἤθη now seems more like essence rather than characters as I thought it was implying earlier. It seems to be the case that the way he is using νοῦς here is radically different from the way it is used in other works and instead means in general some cognitive function without the strict criterium such as searching for truth.

    [Fun Fact Note:] “For the character of sheep and goats, so it is said, is simple-minded and stupid: of all the quadrupeds it is the worst, and it wanders into deserted places towards nothing, and often in wintry weather it goes out from indoors, and when they are caught by the snow they are unwilling to go away unless the shepherd moves them, but are left behind and perish unless the shepherds bring males, and then they follow.” Hahahahahahah.

    Book VIII (IX) 43

    λίχνον δ’ ὂν καὶ πρὸς τὰ μαγειρεῖα καὶ τοὺς ἰχθύας καὶ τήν τοιαύτην ἀπόλαυσιν κατὰ μόνας [ἡ τενθρηδὼν] προσπέταται. [629a30’s]

    Being greedy, [the tenthredon] flies individually on to confectioneries and fish and delicacies of that sort.

    Book VIII (IX) 44

    περὶ δὲ τὰ ἤθη τῶν ζῴων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἔστι θεωρῆσαι διαφορὰς πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μὲν μάλιστα καὶ δειλίαν, ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς πραότητα καὶ ἀγριότητα καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἀγρίων. [629b]

    With regard to the characters of the animals, as we have said previously too, it is possible to [theorize] the differences, chiefly in respect of courage and cowardice, but secondly also in respect of gentleness and wildness, even among the wild ones themselves.

    [I changed ‘observe’ to ‘theorize’]

    [Note to self:] Interesting that he straight up uses ἤθη for animals, something he seems to me to deliberately closely associate with being human in EN Book I.

    In the passage following this, Aristotle discusses lions: they are very dangerous if they are feeding but gentle if fed and thus not hungry. When being hunted, they have a strategy to their running away, which is interesting.

    τὸ τε φοβεῖσθαι μάλιστα τὸ πῦρ… [629b22-3]

    …[the lion’s] chief fear is fire…

    γένη δ’ ἐστὶ λεόντων δύο. τούτων δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν στρογγυλώτερον καὶ οὐλοτριχώτερον δειλότερον, τὸ δὲ μακρότερον καὶ εὔτριχον ἀνδρειότερον. [629b33-630a1]

    There are two kinds of lions; of these the one with the more rounded body and curlier hair is more cowardly, while the longer one with good hair is braver.

    Book VIII (IX) 45

    τεταραγμένου μὲν οὖν καὶ φοβουμένου τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἡ κόπρος, ἀταράκτου δ’ ὄντος οὐκ ἐπικαίει. ἡ μὲν οὖν ἰδέα τοῦ θηρίου καὶ ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη τίς ἐστιν. [630b12-14]

    It is when the bison is distressed and frightened that its dung does this, but when it is free from distress it does not scorch. Such then is the beat’s form and nature.

    [Note to self:] This characterization is very much in line with the idea that the actions of beasts are determined by their affections/feelings, pathe. This is similar in line of thought to A.D. Smith’s paper, “Character and Intellect in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics” (1996)–to, through habituation, a human being can basically silence the affections/feelings and thereby become a person with virtue of character.

    Book VIII (IX) 46

    πάντων δὲ τιθασσότατον καὶ ἡμερώτατον τῶν ἀγρίων ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλέφας ‧ πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ παιδεύεται καὶ ξυνίησιν… ἔστι δὲ καὶ εὐαίσθητον καὶ τῇ συνέσει τῇ ἄλλῃ ὑπερβάλλον. [630b18-22]

    The tamest and gentlest of all the wild animals is the elephant, for there are many things that it both learns and understands… It has quick perception and superior understanding in other respects.

    Again, this is interesting because the animal that seems to be characterized as most similar to human beings (learning, understanding, with perception that allows it understanding that exceeds the other animals, ὑπερβάλλω) is also the ‘tamest and gentlest’ of them all. Suggesting that the paradigmatic or at least exemplifying the most human-like-ness of human beings are also the tamest and gentlest, for which one must not be affected too greatly by their affections/feelings.

    Book VIII (IX) 447: Camels

    A section on camels: I don’t think it’s worth quoting all of it, but it’s interesting because it talks about how male camels aren’t willing to mate with their own mothers and when they do so accidentally (the examples are when a human has made one do so/tried to breed it), it committed suicide (ran off a cliff). This idea of family as well as the sexually-repulsed-by-blood-relatives-adaptation is similar to that of human beings. I wonder which other animals avoid inbreding.

    Book VIII (IX) 48: Dolphins

    καὶ περὶ Καρίαν δὲ ληφθέντος δελφῖνος καὶ τραύματα λαβόντος ἀθρόον ἐλθεῖν λέγεται πλῆθος δελφίνων εἰς τὸν λιμένα μέχριπερ ὁ ἁλιεὺς ἀφῆκεν ‧ τότε δὲ πάλιν ἅμα πάντες ἀπῆλθον. καὶ τοῖς μικροῖς δελφῖσιν ἀκολουθεῖ τις ἀεὶ τῶν μεγάλων φυλακῆς χάριν. [631a12-16]

    It was around Caria too that a large crowd of dolphins is said to have come into the harbour after a dolphin had been captured and wounded, until the fishermen let it go: and then they all went away again together. And the small dolphins are always accompanied by one of the big ones for protection.

    διατρίβουσι δὲ μετ’ ἀλλήλων κατὰ συζυγίας οἱ ἄρρενες ταῖς θηλείαις. διαπορεῖται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν διὰ τί ἐξοκέλλουσιν εἰς τὴν γῆν ‧ ποιεῖν γάρ φασι τοῦτ’ αὐτοὺς ἐνίοτε ὅταν τύχωσι δι’ οὐδεμίαν αἰτίαν. [631b1-5]

    Dolphins spend their time with each other in pairs, males with females. [A problem arises] about them why they beach themselves on the land; for they are said to do this occasionally, at random times, for no cause.

    After a long chapter on how many many features of dolphins and dolphin communities resemble humans and human societies, it is interesting to see how Aristotle in one short concluding sentence seems to disqualify dolphins as a rational animal as he asserts humans are… if he means this sentence as a sort of argument by example for dolphins lacking rationality, it seems a very weak one.

    Book VIII (IX) 49

    ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις κατὰ τὰ πάθη συμβαίνει ποιεῖσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, οὕτω πάλιν καὶ τὰ ἤθη μεταβάλλουσι κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τῶν μορίων ἔνια, οἷον ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρνίθων συμβαίνει. [631b5-8]

    Just as it comes about for all animals that their activities accord with their [affections/feelings], so again their characters too change according to their activities, and often certain bodily parts change as well, such as happens in the case of birds.

    [I changed ‘occasional bodily states’ to ‘affections/feelings’.]

    Book I 1

    πονθε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τὰ μαλάκιά τε καὶ τὰ ὄστρεια. τὰ γὰρ μόρια διαφέρουσι τούτων οὐ τῇ ἀνάλογον ὁμοιότητι… ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοῖς σωματικοῖς πάθεσιν, οἷον μεγέθει μικρότητι… ὅλως δὲ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. [644b10-16]

    Birds, Fishes, Cephalopods, Testacea. Within each of these groups, the parts do not differ so far that they correspond only by analogy… that is, they differ not structurally, but only in respect of bodily qualities, e.g. by being larger or smaller… to put it generally, they differ “by the more and less”.

    Book II 1